A new article by Bart Schuurman, Sarah L. Carthy and Graig R. Klein asks an important question for terrorism prevention: do the factors that distinguish extremists who become involved in terrorist violence from those who do not depend on their ideology?
Much of what we know about radicalisation and terrorism comes from research on Salafi Jihadist extremism. But the extremist threat landscape has changed, with right wing, anti government and other forms of extremism becoming increasingly important. This raises a practical question: can knowledge and prevention approaches developed in one ideological context also be applied to others?
The researchers examined 206 radicalised individuals from Europe, North America and Australia using the Non Involvement in Terrorist Violence dataset. Half had become involved in terrorist violence and half had not, although many in the second group had engaged in other extremist or illegal activities. The sample included 103 right wing extremists and 103 Salafi Jihadists. The researchers tested whether 39 factors previously found to distinguish involvement from non involvement in terrorist violence operated differently across the two ideologies.
The main finding is striking: ideology made surprisingly little difference. Of the 39 factors examined, only three showed statistically significant differences between right wing and Salafi Jihadist extremists. These were perceptions that the state had used excessive force against a group or movement with which the individual identified, perceptions that an extremist group or movement was calling for political violence, and self control.
The first two factors were more strongly associated with terrorist violence among right wing extremists. The authors suggest that context may help explain this. Calls for violence and state violence are relatively common features of the environments in which Salafi Jihadist movements have operated. In Western right wing extremist settings, these experiences may be less common and therefore potentially more significant when they occur. Differences involving self control were more complex and the authors caution that this finding requires further investigation.
The broader result, however, is the similarity across ideologies. For 36 of the 39 factors, there was no statistically significant evidence that their relationship with terrorist violence differed between right wing and Salafi Jihadist extremists.
This has potentially important implications for prevention. It suggests that interventions developed to prevent one form of terrorism may also be relevant to other extremist movements, rather than requiring completely different approaches for every ideology. This does not mean ideology is unimportant. Ideology can shape identity, justify violence, influence target selection and bind extremist groups together. But when it comes to the specific question of why some radicalised individuals become involved in terrorist violence while others do not, the underlying factors may be more similar across ideologies than previously assumed.