Sebastien Bishop’s recent paper, “Should we hate hate speech regulation? The argument from viewpoint discrimination,” published in The Philosophical Quarterly, discusses the complexities of hate speech regulation. Bishop critiques the arguments against regulation, particularly those presented by James Weinstein, and proposes a more nuanced perspective on viewpoint discrimination.
The paper begins by acknowledging the importance of democratic values, which some philosophers, including Weinstein, argue necessitate a tolerant approach to hate speech. They claim that even if hate speech causes significant harm, democratic values sometimes call for a hands-off approach. This perspective emphasises the value of citizens being free to criticise and voice dissent towards the laws that bind them. However, Bishop challenges the strength of this argument, suggesting that it is less convincing upon closer examination.
Building on Weinstein’s discussion of viewpoint discrimination, Bishop constructs a more compelling objection to hate speech regulation. He argues that while hate speech regulation is essential for preventing harm, it must be implemented with a focus on transparency and consistency to avoid the pitfalls of viewpoint discrimination. This approach does not call for the abolition of all hate speech regulation but instead highlights the need for a fair and balanced application of these laws.
Bishop’s analysis dives into the nature of hate speech, describing it as communication that vilifies and promotes hostility towards vulnerable social groups. He underscores the real and potential harms of hate speech, noting that it can set the stage for violence by dehumanising targeted groups. Social scientific studies cited in the paper show that dehumanising language reduces empathy and increases support for violence against these groups. The paper also explores the broader psychological and societal impacts of hate speech, linking it to processes of radicalisation and the erosion of social cohesion.
The crux of Bishop’s argument lies in the concept of viewpoint discrimination. He critiques the selective application of hate speech laws, arguing that inconsistency in enforcement undermines democratic values. Bishop emphasises that the government’s justifications for regulating hate speech must be free from bias and should be applied uniformly across different forms of harmful speech. He points out that transparency in the reasons for regulation is crucial for maintaining public trust and ensuring that regulations serve their intended purpose without unfairly targeting specific viewpoints.